Introduction
Hong Kong had loomed large on the international legal agenda, albeit not necessarily in the institutional sense of the term, in the period leading to the resumption of sovereignty by the People"s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997. Since then, academic and policy interest in its unique status has largely subsided. This may be attributed to the fact that the issue has formally been settled and the absence of effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of compliance with the bilateral accord underpinning the new legal order. The marginalisation of the subject has arguably left an analytical vacuum as several dimensions of the post-1997 picture merit attention on the part of international lawyers. One topic that continues to be of both practical and theoretical importance --the unconstrained pursuit, within the "One Country, Two Systems framework, of key strategic goals in the external arena --is addressed from logicallyinterrelated perspectives in this paper.
It should be noted at the outset that, from an international legal and constitutional standpoint, Hong Kong has emerged in 1997 from an extended period of colonial dependence, although of a mostly enlightened variety, not as an integral part of the Chinese body politic but as a highly autonomous entity empowered to pursue its domestic socio-economic agenda in a virtually unfettered fashion and to conduct selectively its external affairs without overt involvement by the central government in Beijing or any of its provincial arms. This ingenious structural configuration, allowing a quintessentially capitalist enclave to continue to function smoothly on the fringes of "Communist" China Trade Organisation (WTO). 4 PRC membership is not an impediment because the CPG is committed to facilitating Hong Kong"s presence (BL 152) and ensuring that the international organisations involved maintain offices in the territory on quasi-diplomatic terms (BL 157).
As a thriving commercial and financial centre, and a vibrant communications and logistics/transportation hub, which performs a vital regional and global role, Hong Kong conducts its external affairs through non-governmental institutional vehicles as well as their governmental counterparts. This manifests itself in the domestic arena, where various independent entities (e.g., the Asia Business Council, Asia Society, Better Hong Kong Foundation, Civic Exchange, country-specific chambers of commerce, Hong Kong
Council of Social Services, local universities, Oxfam, Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council/PECC and Vision 2047) 5 devote substantial resources to advancing the 3 For a list of the international organisations limited to states in which representatives of the HKSAR government participate, in accordance with BL 152, as members of delegations of the PRC, or in such other capacity as may be permitted by the CPG and the international organisation concerned, see: http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/topical/iorg_Its.html. 4 For a list of intergovernmental organisations not limited to states in which the HKSAR participates using the name "Hong Kong, China," see: http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/topical/iorg_gov.html. 5 rather conservative interpretation of the external affairs powers and responsibilities granted to the territory under the BL. 23 The purpose of the present paper is to examine this subject from a descriptive, analytical and normative perspective.
Restraint Hinders Progress on the External Front
The rather narrow path followed by the local bureaucracy in deploying the HKSAR"s external relations capabilities is reflected most palpably in the tendency to display a Moreover, two major environmental agreements, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 28 and its Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity 29 have yet to be extended to the territory by China, which is one of the original signatories. It has to be acknowledged that, this notwithstanding, the HKSAR Government has embarked on several initiatives to protect the territory"s natural environment. 30 Be that as it may, the results fall short of meeting the obligations prescribed under the CBD. Of particular relevance in this context is the requirement imposed on contracting parties to formulate long-term national strategies, plans or programmes for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
By the same token, Hong Kong has failed to capitalise on its status as a respected member of key regional multilateral forums in order to help shape the regional and global The inference to be drawn in light of this experience is that even in areas deemed to be economically sensitive, such as environmental protection, the process of converting Hong
Kong"s external relations potential into a vigorous programme of implementation is evolving in an uneven fashion. The commitment here is deeper and the momentum stronger than elsewhere, but there is a sense of strategic selectivity, which may be grounded in political logic, and the pace apparently varies according to the dynamics of the Hong Kong-China relationship. Given the prevailing constraints and the potentially costly implications of a more adventurous policy course, the pattern witnessed is not
entirely inconsistent with what one might typically expect in such circumstances, but the picture that emerges suggests a tendency to err invariably on the side of caution and not to take proper advantage of opportunities for legitimate international role expansion where the risks are distinctly modest.
The terrorist challenge is also not addressed in an unambiguously resolute manner.
Generally, the territory is perceived as a faithful participant in the "war against 31 See ICGD Study, note 23 above. Law) and other, "softer" sources of international law. 43 Hong Kong courts are not constitutionally or legally impeded, and are fully competent to decide questions of international law that arise in the course of legal proceedings over which they exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the domestic legal system. Specifically, subject to the overarching limitation resulting from the exclusion of "defence and foreign affairs" from the territory"s control, the HKSAR courts are required to "adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws applicable in the Region" (BL 84), including, when applicable, international law. Indeed, judges are not merely authorised to apply international law, but they may also incur international responsibility for its misapplication. The duty thus imposed extends to judicially reviewing executive acts for conformity with the territory"s international legal obligations and to interpreting HKSAR law consistent with international law.
The HKSAR judiciary is highly regarded in the Asian Pacific region for its independence, integrity, professionalism, the breadth/depth of its jurisprudence, and the respect shown generally to international judicial decisions. It may also be contended that such a reputation has been further enhanced after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, given the unique composition of the HKSAR Court of Final Appeal (which includes distinguished judges from other common law jurisdictions). 44 Concerns have nonetheless been expressed over incidents that gave rise to perceptions, whose validity cannot be categorically dismissed, that the power of final adjudication stems in some crucial respects from an institutional source other than the Court of Final Appeal. 
Towards a More Meaningful External Architecture
As the examination undertaken in the preceding section of the paper illustrates, post-1997
Hong Kong may have fallen short of fulfilling the potential for effective external action inherent in the international legal façade erected by the PRC and the United Kingdom.
This manifests itself in key strategic domains and across-the-(policy)-board. The current configuration may be portrayed as sub-optimal in this respect and a more satisfactory pattern should arguably be pursued. From a normative perspective, it is not inappropriate to suggest a blueprint broadly consistent with the territory"s status as an "international legal person" 48 and the emerging notion of "global citizenship." In passing, it should be noted that such a blueprint dovetails with the general imperative to convert the "Asia World City" formula, which looms large on the Hong Kong public agenda, but is seldom infused with any substance, into a macro vision to drive the territory"s legitimate international aspirations (without, of course, encroaching on China"s sovereignty). This may involve taking steps extending beyond the traditional boundaries of economics and trade, and exercising regional leadership on the cultural, environmental, humanitarian, legal, political and social fronts in a distinctly "international" fashion.
As pointed out earlier, the territory is subject to a wide range of international legal obligations grounded both in treaties and "soft law."
50 Most palpable commitments stemming from the latter source include the promotion of sustainable development 51 -at the national, regional and global level -and the effective prevention of and appropriate response to disasters and major public health threats, within the broad framework of "human security" enhancement. 52 Given the high standard of living enjoyed by its residents, as well as the sophisticated physical and institutional infrastructure underpinning economic activity in Hong Kong, the territory can be said to carry "industrialized country-type" responsibilities assumed by participants in the "global Specifically, Hong Kong is expected to take concrete steps to adopt and execute in a comprehensive fashion its own domestic socio-economic strategies in order to achieve internationally agreed-upon development objectives such as the UN"s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 55 By the same token, it needs to support tangibly efforts by poorer countries to embrace and implement in a satisfactory manner policies conducive to socio-economic progress -inter alia, through constructive development assistance schemes. 56 In addition, it should act to facilitate the contribution of non-governmental organisations, civil society, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders towards the improvement in the quality of the domestic socio-economic environment and the global system in which it is embedded.
Being an integral part, even if a distinct one for administrative purposes, of the world"s "largest [and most dynamic] developing country" imposes a particularly heavy burden in that context. This dimension of the picture is highlighted in a recent Greenpeace report 57 which focuses on the negative externalities generated as a result of China"s rampant economic expansion, especially its disruptive ecological consequences. The corollary is that Hong Kong has to go to great lengths in pursuing the environmental protection component of the goal of sustainable development. With reference to the challenges posed by the mainland in this respect, it behoves the territory to intensify its cross-border cooperation and include in the policy repertoire significant measures to alleviate trans- inevitably require the territory to play a regional leadership role in combating health hazards and discharge its general responsibilities in a manner befitting a "global citizen."
Those responsibilities clearly extend to providing humanitarian assistance to areas seriously affected by major natural disasters such as the recent Indian Ocean tsunami. 63 While Hong Kong"s contribution, as a single-city donation (HK$ 700 million) and on a per-capita basis (HK$ 100) has exceeded that of other equivalent donors, 64 this particular spontaneous display of compassion at the grass-roots level, mirrored in public opinion surveys at a number of junctures, 65 has not found a coherent expression, let alone of the formal type, in government policy. The latter continues to evolve in an ad hoc fashion and lacks a comprehensive framework for addressing the consequences of catastrophes in an efficient and equitable manner.
Hong Kong is a special administrative region of another country and its foreign affairs are the prerogative of the PRC. Nevertheless, its unique status, coupled with superior capabilities, implies greater international commitments than might be expected in the case of affluent metropolises in general. It is little known that the government set up in 1994 a Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which supports local NGOs in their endeavours to offer disaster relief elsewhere. There is ample scope to convert this narrow-based organisational instrument into a wider channel for overseas development assistance, yet no significant official initiatives have been taken in this respect. 66 It is obvious that any progress towards fulfilling the global citizen vision hinges on parallel movement directed at fostering a supportive environment for civil society organisations, which need to be empowered to play a more active role regionally and internationally. As matters stand, they are inadequately equipped, both in terms of resources and mindset, to embark on such a course, a pattern that diverges from that witnessed in other jurisdictions with similar socio-economic characteristics. The prevailing constraints and the attitudinal consequences thereof are duly reflected in current organisational positioning and views communicated in personal interviews.
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The corollary is that the government must adopt a more constructive posture vis-à-vis
NGOs fundamentally suited for this challenging task. The latter need explicit encouragement and concrete assistance to acquire the necessary international skills and international centre of commerce and finance sensitise it to Western forms of artistic expression. 72 The territory is thus uniquely qualified to act as a cultural hub and should intensify its efforts to invest in "cultural capital" in its various forms 73 (including the development of "cultural tourism").
It needs to be emphasised that, as reflected in applicable international legal instruments, the protection of cultural heritage and measures geared towards its enhancement are not viewed as merely supporting the ends of cultural capital formation and dissemination.
They are also considered as invaluable means of promoting international harmony by increasing mutual understanding across cultures and fostering a climate of tolerance among peoples. 74 For this reason, international cultural relations have become an integral part of modern diplomacy and the management of external relations.
About 1% of the government budget is devoted to culture. This is not an insignificant figure by regional, and even international, standards. Yet, it is debatable whether the resources are deployed creatively and within a framework of strategic priorities. Various projects are embarked upon by different segments of the bureaucracy in an ad hoc fashion and without being inspired by a deep insight into the international underpinnings of cultural capital formation. Hong Kong does not have a coherent cultural exchange policy and its international cultural identity is said to be languishing. Paradoxically, the exportation of culture lags substantially behind its importation. 75 Such deficiencies merit careful policy attention. 76 There is less ambiguity, or perhaps no ambiguity at all, with respect to the commitment to the principles of legal transparency and accountability. Indeed, this is a critical area where Hong Kong may act as a beacon to most of its neighbours. The vitality of the local common law system has prompted experienced observers 77 to suggest that the territory has the necessary attributes to evolve into a leading regional/international dispute resolution centre. Strong emphasis has been placed in this context on the government"s determination to uphold the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, distinctly low level of corruption, high degree of openness and visibility, efficient process, predictability of outcome, enforceability of judgments, abundance of professional expertise and excellent physical infrastructure (including a wide range of sophisticated communications and transport channels).
By the same token, Hong Kong"s legal capabilities qualify it for a regional leadership role on the corporate governance front. The edifice the territory has established in this increasingly focal area falls somewhat short of best international practices (structural gaps receiving attention include inadequate protection for minority investors, unavailability of class actions, overly liberal enforcement and the absence of a super regulatory body possessing substantial investigative powers). 78 Nevertheless, Hong
Kong is comfortably ahead of other economies in the region (Australia, New Zealand and Singapore being a possible exception to the norm) in terms of the depth of its corporate governance regime. 79 It already provides a platform for ongoing exchanges on the subject and could broaden its involvement further.
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To realise its potential as a positive catalyst for relevant legal/institutional reforms beyond its borders, Hong Kong needs to adhere unambiguously to international human possible threats to the freedom of assembly and association, the lack of domestic legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in the private sector, potential encroachments on the freedom of the press (media self-censorship), arguably draconian proposed national security legislation (shelved but not buried) and the halting progress towards genuinely representative government. 83 The government has attempted to respond to some of these concerns, albeit at times unevenly and not always in practical terms. 84 It is legitimate to assert that a more concerted effort to address such and other policy gaps identified in this section is required, if the territory is to move onto the regional/global stage in a manner consistent with expectations embedded in relevant international agreements and its own capabilities. 81 See reports cited in note 14 above. 82 
Institutional Dynamics
The survey and analysis undertaken in this paper lead to the conclusion that Hong Kong enjoys, by virtue of the unique international legal arrangements governing its position as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC, a considerable scope for conducting its external affairs in a discretionary and meaningful fashion. Indeed, it can be argued that it is incumbent upon the territory to act in accordance with the powers granted to it and its own formidable endowments. However, as demonstrated here, the current configuration does not fully conform to the prescriptive model. The question thus arises whether it is possible to account systematically for the divergence between prescription and execution.
As indicated in the main body of the text on a number of occasions, Hong Kong restraint may be attributed partly to narrow self-interest. 85 The adjective "narrow" is employed in this context in order to suggest that issue-specific considerations may at times dominate broader factors, culminating in decisions that may be grounded in sound tactical logic but may not necessarily generate strategic advantages for the territory as a whole (i.e., longterm/community-wide benefits may be sacrificed because of the desire to sustain shortterm/selective progress). Such "myopic" responses are common and by no means confined to Hong Kong. 86 An explanation with more structural underpinnings might centre on the nature of the bureaucratic process. Approaching the picture from such an angle is also interesting from an international legal perspective for it brings into focus the often encountered gap between prescriptions rooted in international law and institutional realities. 87 The point is that the pre-1997 Hong Kong bureaucracy, in many respects inward-looking and static in its orientation, was neither adequately equipped nor sufficiently prepared to make the quantum leap into the post-1997 era and confront effectively the external challenges bound to emerge following the resumption of sovereignty by the PRC within the "One Country, Two Systems" framework. This observation remains valid today. 88 Post-1997 reforms have exacerbated the problem to a certain extent. Their official aim is to pave the way to representative government. Yet, because of their piecemeal character, they have resulted in substantial institutional fragmentation and even a degree of policy paralysis. According to a leading social scientist, the political system has become "disarticulated." Specifically, given that the set-up amounts to "neither parliamentary fish nor presidential fowl, the executive, the bureaucracy and the legislature (which is divided within itself) each pursue their own agendas, punctuated by occasional skirmishes on the boundaries of their domains and by subterranean campaigns to extend their jurisdictions." 89 Moreover, building external bridges and pursuing the "global citizen" vision may not be top priorities for the local bureaucracy. 90 It is legitimate to contend that those who presently occupy its high layers display a "northern"/mainland orientation rather than a cosmopolitan outlook. Their principal objective seems to be the maximisation of Chinarelated advantages and the minimisation of China-related risks. To pursue a bolder and more multi-dimensional strategy might be perceived as tantamount to opening a Pandora box. 91 It has been further argued, quite compellingly but somewhat controversially, that the tension between quasi-authoritarian and democratic forces (the former restraining and the latter challenging) has led to a "crisis of legitimacy" and has triggered a process of "political decay" in post-1997 Hong Kong. The origins of the former can be traced to rising democratic aspirations in a complex urban environment, where the emerging social structure is skewed towards the middle class against the backdrop of selective infringements on local autonomy by China (and occasionally by the pre-1997 government, in the twilight of colonial rule). The lack of sensitivity apparently exhibited vis-à-vis these aspirations is thought to be a source of widespread cynicism that manifest itself directly and indirectly regarding government institutions and the political establishment presiding over them.
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Political decay is another potential symptom of "reverse democratisation." 93 It seems to take the form of a tangible deterioration in government performance as evidenced, inter alia, by the adoption of a Third World-style personal rule at top echelons of the executive branch, reliance on patron-client networks, politicisation of the judiciary, cavalier attitude towards freedoms in general and civil liberties in particular, indifference to public opinion, poor response to demands emanating from the grass roots, erratic policy formulation and implementation, symbolic manipulation, and propensity to play one segment of the community against another.
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This rather harsh liberal critique may not accord fully with prevailing post-1997 Hong Kong institutional realities. It is debatable whether the territory is experiencing reverse democratisation in the strict sense of the term, a serious crisis of legitimacy and accelerating political decay. Nevertheless, it highlights the conflicting forces at work and the selective deterioration in the social climate. Progressive strategic initiatives are inevitably regarded as the product of democratic influences and thus not sufficiently aligned with Chinese interests. In this climate, one may expect the executive arm of the Hong Kong Government to move cautiously on the external front, the considerable 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid.
